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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 41 SUMMER 1990 NUMBER 4
LENDER LIABILITY UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT
ROGER J. MARZULLA*
BRETT G. KAPPEL**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Superfund' hazardous waste cleanup program has its roots in
one of the most dramatic environmental and public health stories of
recent decades-Love Canal.2 As industrial wastes and toxic sub-
stances buried decades earlier at Love Canal began seeping into base-
ments and bubbling to the surface, America's awakening environmen-
tal consciousness mobilized to bring about adoption of the most far-
* Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Washington, D.C. Mr. Marzulla
concentrates his practice on environmental law and is formerly Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Justice Department. B.A., University of
Santa Clara, 1968; J.D., University of Santa Clara School of Law, 1971.
** Associate, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Washington, D.C. B.A., State
University of New York at Albany, 1980; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law,
1990.
1. "Superfund" is the popular name for the hazardous waste cleanup program estab-
lished by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2. See, Silverman, Love Canal: A Retrospective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20-Part
II, at 835 (Sept. 15, 1989).
1
Marzulla and Kappel: Lender Liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Published by Scholar Commons, 1990
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reaching and expensive environmental program ever undertaken.
Drafted hurriedly to address a perceived environmental emergency,
3
CERCLA devised a unique liability scheme whose breadth and reach
only now are starting to be comprehended. Indeed, one searches in
vain among the legislative debates of the time to find any substantive
reference to the role of banks, real estate developers or secured parties
in the hazardous waste cleanup program. Yet today, a mere ten years
after adoption of the statute, perhaps seventy percent of major real
estate transactions (not to mention corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions) involve significant environmental concerns, and few real estate
transactions go forward without an environmental audit.4
How has a toxic waste cleanup program aimed at industrial pol-
luters become a major hurdle in many modern real estate transactions?
By what star can real estate investors steer the uncharted waters of
Superfund liability? This article attempts to provide some guidance by
first describing the operation of the Superfund program, next applying
its concepts to lending and real estate transactions, and finally sug-
gesting some strategies for dealing with environmental liabilities inher-
ent in today's real estate and lending marketplace.
II. THE THEORY OF CERCLA LIABILITY
Novel problems beget novel legislation, and the CERCLA liability
scheme adopted by Congress is a legislative collection of concepts
drawn from tort, property, contract, and agency law principles en-
grafted upon a massive national program of hazardous waste cleanup.
Under CERCLA, a potentially responsible party (PRP) is not only
strictly liable regardless of the care exercised in disposing of the
waste, 5 and severally liable for the entire cost of cleanup regardless of
3. CERCLA's hurried passage in the closing hours of the 96th Congress led to a
legislative history which could be described most charitably as poor. The lack of a defini-
tive legislative history has handicapped courts attempting to construe the statute's
broadly drafted provisions. The comments of Chief Judge Russell G. Clark of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri are typical: "CERCLA is in
fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and
deleted provisions.. . . [N]umerous important features were deleted during the closing
hours of the Congressional session. The courts are once again placed in the undesirable
and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (citations omitted), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
4. See O'Brien, Environmental Due Diligence: Introduction in ENVMONAENTAL DUE
DILIGENCE: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE LENDERS, BUYERS, SELLERS,
AND ATTORNEYS (J. O'Brien & W. Frank eds. 1989).
5. E.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
[Vol. 41
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how many other PRPs there may be (when these costs are indivisible).'
Apart from proving that someone else was the sole cause of the release
of the hazardous substance into the environment, the defendant in a
Superfund suit has only two legally-allowable defenses: (1) that the re-
lease was caused by an act of war, or (2) that it was caused by an act of
God.7 A PRP may not seek court relief while the government is clean-
ing up the site with money drawn from the Superfund, but must wait
until the government has completed all of the work.8 When a PRP fi-
nally does get to court, it is not entitled to a jury trial. Furthermore,
the PRP may present little, if any, evidence in the case, since review
by the court is limited to the administrative record prepared by the
government,9 whose judgments are entitled to deference by the court
unless they are found to be arbitrary and capricious. 10
Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the federal government to re-
spond to the release 1 or threatened release of a hazardous substance
2
into the environment by taking any action "necessary to protect the
public health or welfare or the environment."' 3 In order to pay for
nied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo.
1987); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986).
6. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171; Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1312-13; United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
7. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (Supp. V 1987).
9. CERCLA § 113(j)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
10. CERCLA § 113(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
11. Section 101(22) of CERCLA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pump-
ing, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant
or contaminant) .... ." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. V 1987).
12. Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" to include a large
number of materials regulated under other federal environmental statutes. The list of
hazardous substances includes those that are regulated under section 311(b)(2)(A) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
hazardous wastes that have the characteristics identified in section 3001 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); toxic pollutants listed
under section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); hazardous air pollutants listed under section 112 of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); and hazardous substances that are regulated under section
7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)
(Supp. V 1987). This Article uses the terms hazardous wastes and hazardous substances
interchangeably.
13. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Section 104 re-
sponse actions take one of two forms. A removal action is an immediate action taken to
"prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environ-
ment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release." CERCLA §
101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. V 1987). Removal actions include providing fencing
to limit access to the hazardous waste site, furnishing alternative water supplies and
1990]
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these governmental response actions, CERCLA established the Haz-
ardous Substances Response Trust Fund, popularly known as the
Superfund. 14 If the federal government taps the Superfund to pay for a
response action, it may then sue the potentially responsible parties to
recover its costs.15
Section 107 of CERCLA sets forth the following four classes of
persons"0 who may be held liable for remedial response costs: (1) the
current owner or operator of a hazardous waste disposal facility;17 (2)
any person who owned or operated such a facility at the time of waste
disposal; (3) hazardous waste generators who arranged for the disposal
of such waste at the facility; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste
who selected the facility for the disposal of hazardous waste. 8
As a result of congressional deadlock over the appropriate stan-
dard of liability, CERCLA as originally adopted failed to specify
clearly the standard that courts were to apply in Superfund cases. Sub-
temporarily evacuating potentially affected individuals. Id. In contrast, a remedial action
is a permanent remedy designed "to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment." CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)
(Supp. V 1987). Remedial actions include containing hazardous wastes within earthen
dikes and then capping the waste site with a clay cover. Id.
14. CERCLA § 221, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (repealed). Congress originally ap-
proved $1.6 billion for the Superfund. Of this amount, 87.5% came from a special tax on
petroleum and other chemicals, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662 (1982 & Supp. V
1987), and 12.5% came from general appropriations, see 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982)
(repealed 1986). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA], significantly expanded the
Superfund in 1986, making $8.5 billion available to fund response actions undertaken
during the five years ending in 1991. See Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, §§ 501-531, 100 Stat. 1613, 1760-1782 (1986).
15. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
16. Section 101(21) of CERCLA defines the term "person" to include "an individ-
ual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial en-
tity, United States Government, State municipality, political subdivision of a state, or
any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. V 1987).
17. Section 101(9) of CERCLA defines a "facility" as follows:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, la-
goon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located ....
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. V 1987). In addition, the courts have
given this term a very broad interpretation so that today virtually any site where hazard-
ous wastes have come to rest qualifies as a facility for purposes of CERCLA liability.
See, eg., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (drag
strip which had been sprayed with oil contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) determined to be a facility under CERCLA).
18. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1987).
(Vol. 41
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sequent judicial interpretation, however, has confirmed that all classes
of PRPs are strictly liable,"9 and that they incur joint and several lia-
bility for all cleanup costs unless the contribution of each party to the
need for cleanup is clearly severable.2 Thus, the proverbial "one barrel
generator" at a Superfund site may be held liable for the entire cost of
cleanup, as may the owner or operator of the site, unless one of three
available statutory defenses can be proved.
As stated earlier, section 107(b) of CERCLA provides that a po-
tentially responsible party can avoid liability if the PRP can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release of hazardous sub-
stances was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or was the
sole act or omission of a third party who has no contractual relation-
ship to the potential defendant.2 The third-party defense is available,
however, only if the potential defendant took precautions against the
foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party.
22
In 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) modified the third-party defense by defining the term "con-
tractual relationship" to include instruments transferring title or pos-
session to real property unless the purchaser did not know or had no
reason to know that hazardous substances had been disposed of on the
property.23 In order to invoke this innocent landowner defense, pur-
chasers of real property must show that at the time of purchase they
made "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in
19. Section 101(32) of CERCLA defines the standard of liability as the same stan-
dard which applies under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32)
(West Supp. 1989). At the time that CERCLA was adopted, a substantial body of case
law interpreted section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as establishing a
standard of strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621
F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); United States v. Tex-
Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1978). Courts have relied on Congress's knowl-
edge of these earlier rulings to decide that CERCLA calls for a standard of strict liabil-
ity. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
af/'d in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 199;
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 844.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
23. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
1990]
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an effort to minimize liability. '24
The innocent landowner defense effectively added a third element
of proof to the third-party defense. Today, in order to establish the
third party defense, a defendant must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it (1) exercised due care with regard to the hazard-
ous substance, (2) took precautions against the foreseeable acts or
omission of the third party, and (3) purchased the property without
knowing or having reason to know that the property was contaminated
by hazardous substances.25
III. LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Aimed at hazardous waste generators, the CERCLA of 1980 makes
only awkward reference to security interests in real property,26 under-
scoring the lack of input from the real estate and banking industries in
the drafting of the statute. Although CERCLA imposes strict liability
upon the owner of property, little thought seems to have been given to
the potential liability of a secured lender who forecloses, thereby tak-
ing title. Congress also did not define with great specificity the term
"operator" (of a hazardous waste facility), opening the door to the ar-
gument that the imposition of certain loan conditions upon a borrower
who handles hazardous waste may render the lender an operator of the
hazardous facility. In fact, it may be said that the issue of lender liabil-
ity was almost completely overlooked by Congress in drafting the
24. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. V 1987). In deciding
whether a defendant has made an appropriate inquiry, courts are directed to consider
any expertise possessed by the defendant, the purchase price of the property as com-
pared to its value if uncontaminated, reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of contamination at the site and the ability to detect such
contamination by an appropriate inspection. Id.
25. Section 101(35)(A) of CERCLA states that in addition to establishing that the
purchaser had no reason to know that the property was contaminated, "the defendant
must establish that he has satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of
this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
26. Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA provides that the term "'owner or operator'.
does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987). The legislative history of CERCLA
is similarly uninformative. The report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries on an earlier version of the legislation which eventually became CERCLA
states only that the provision was intended to exclude from liability "persons possessing
indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the
management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan
or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws,
rules, or regulations." H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1., at 36, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6160, 6181.
[Vol. 41
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/3
LENDER LIABLiTY
Superfund scheme. Thus, it has fallen to the courts to define the na-
ture and extent of this liability. Likewise, it has fallen to counsel for
banks, developers and investors to struggle with forecasts of the out-
come of this unpredictable litigation. The fundamental principles of
lender liability under CERCLA are derived from a handful of district
court decisions and remain subject to changes in the direction of the
government's environmental enforcement program as well as the vagar-
ies of appellate review.
The crux of the problem is rooted in the metaphysics of real estate
secured transactions. Whether the lender itself takes legal title or that
title remains legally in the borrower or is transferred to a third-party
trustee under a deed of trust, all secured parties have a right to fore-
close the mortgagor's interest in the security to pay off a defaulted
loan. Whether the property is located in a "lien theory" or "title the-
ory" state,27 the result of the foreclosure is the same: unless a third
party overbids the amount of the loan (plus allowable fees and costs),
the lender ends up taking title to the property. Hence, the first critical
CERCLA interpretation for lenders is whether a foreclosing lender who
takes title thereby becomes an "owner" liable under the statute.
A. The Lender as Owner
As originally enacted, CERCLA defined the term "owner or
operator" of a hazardous waste facility as follows:
[iln the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, [the term
includes] any person owning or operating such facility .... Such
term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.2 8
There is virtually no legislative history to explain the exact pur-
pose Congress intended to serve by creating this security interest ex-
27. The nature of the security interest that a lender has in secured property during
the term of the mortgage is treated differently by different states. Under the "title the-
ory," the lender holds title to the real property until the entire mortgage debt has been
satisfied, whereupon title to the property passes to the borrower. Thirteen states follow
this rule. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 599 (D.
Md. 1986). The majority of states, however, follow the "lien theory," which holds that
during the term of the mortgage the lender merely has a first priority lien on the secured
real property. Under the "lien theory," then, the borrower holds title to the property at
all times. See G. OSBoRNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrr EN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 1.5,
4.1, 4.2 (1979).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982) (emphasis added), amended by 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
1990]
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emption. 20 If anything, what little legislative history exists indicates
that the security interest exemption was intended to apply to a variety
of financing arrangements-not just those used to purchase real prop-
erty.30 Commentators have interpreted this provision as a conscious
policy choice by Congress to exempt lenders from liability under CER-
CLA in order to serve other goals.3 1 The courts that have interpreted
this provision, however, have come to the conclusion that lenders may
be held liable for CERCLA cleanup costs.2
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust,33 the court found a
foreclosing lender liable under CERCLA, sending shock waves through
the nation's financial institutions. Until that decision, the lending com-
munity (if it thought about Superfund liability at all) glanced at the
so-called "security interest exemption" under the statute and assumed
that lenders had nothing to fear. After all, the definition of "owner"
specifically excluded "a person who, without participating in the man-
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. '34 It seemed to
follow, they thought, that a foreclosing lender would not become a
CERCLA "owner" merely by reason of the foreclosure. Properly under-
stood, they reasoned correctly.
Maryland Bank & Trust involved a lender who held a security
interest in property which had been used for the disposal of 237 drums
of hazardous waste. When the borrower defaulted, the lender insti-
tuted a foreclosure action and subsequently purchased the property at
the foreclosure sale. One year after the lender purchased the property,
the former owner notified state officials that hazardous wastes had
been dumped on the site and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) initiated a response action. The EPA then brought suit against
29. See supra note 3 (discussing scant legislative history of CERCLA).
30. See supra note 26.
31. See, e.g., Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders
in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1273 (1987) (security interest ex-
emption intended to exclude security interest holders from liability because they have
only a tenuous connection to the hazardous waste site) [hereinafter When a Security
Becomes a Liability]; Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Partici-
pation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE LJ. 925, 926 (1989) (security
interest exemption intended to encourage banks to investigate potential lenders before
lending and to encourage lenders to monitor borrower's activities during term of the
loan) [hereinafter Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation].
32. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4,1985).
33. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
34. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
[Vol. 41
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the lender to recover $551,713.50 in response costs. 5
Maryland Bank & Trust (MB&T) argued that, as a former mort-
gagee which had purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, it was
exempt from liability under the security interest exemption of section
101(20)(A). 8 The court ruled, however, that the "exemption of subsec-
tion (20)(A) covers only those persons who, at the time of the cleanup,
hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the
land .. . The mortgage held by MB&T (the security interest) termi-
nated at the foreclosure sale . ..at which time it ripened into full
title."
To reach this result, the court adopted a narrow interpretation of
the purpose behind the security interest exemption. The court noted
that in Maryland, a title theory state, the financial institution granting
a mortgage holds title to the property while the mortgage is in effect.
The court concluded that "Congress intended by this exception to ex-
clude these common law title mortgagees from the definition of 'owner'
since title was in their hands only by operation of the common law."3"
The court in Maryland Bank & Trust also appears to have
reached this result because it felt that any other interpretation of the
security interest exemption would result in a windfall to the lender." If
the exemption applied to a lender-turned-owner, the lender could
purchase the property in its contaminated condition, allow the EPA to
clean up the property using public funds, and then turn around and
sell the newly unpolluted land at a substantial profit. In effect, the
lender would be capturing the value of cleaning the property without
having to pay for it.40 The court reasoned that such an interpretation
"would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial insti-
tutions, protecting them against possible losses due to the security of
35. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 575-76.
36. See id. at 577.
37. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
38. Id. A number of commentators have taken strong exception to this overly tech-
nical interpretation of the security interest exemption. See, e.g., Burcat, Environmental
Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors and Other Deep Pockets, 103
BANKING L.J. 509, 534 (1986) ("Under the court's interpretation, only mortgagees in thir-
teen states have some limited protection. Presumably, mortgagees in other states and
secured creditors holding security other than a mortgage have no protection under CER-
CLA.. . . This, clearly, is not the intent of Congress or CERCLA.").
39. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580; see also Guidice v. BFG Electro-
plating & Mfg. Co., No. 86-2093, slip op. at 18 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1989) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds database) (In course of continuing case, district court denied lender's motion to
dismiss, holding that "[w]hen a lender is a successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the
lender should be liable to the same extent as any other at the sale would have been.").
40. See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
1990]
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loans with polluted properties. '1 The court noted that financial insti-
tutions have the power to protect themselves from such losses by mak-
ing prudent loans.
4 2
Despite the ruling in Maryland Bank & Trust, a lender that fore-
closes on a hazardous waste facility and then purchases the facility at
the subsequent foreclosure sale may still argue that it is exempt from
CERCLA liability on the basis that its conduct shows that its actions
were taken purely to protect the lender's security interest in the
property.
43
In United States v. Mirabile,44 a federal district court ruled that a
lender that had foreclosed on a hazardous waste disposal site and was
the high bidder at the later foreclosure sale was entitled to the protec-
tion of the security interest exemption. The court granted the lender's
motion for summary judgment on the basis that "its actions with re-
spect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort to protect
its security interest in the property. 45 Both before and after the fore-
closure sale the lender had negotiated with other parties about
purchasing the property. After the sale the lender made no attempt to
continue the operations of the former owner which had contaminated
the property with hazardous substances. The lender did, however, peri-
odically visit the site for the purpose of showing it to prospective pur-
chasers. In addition, the lender took steps to prevent the property
from being vandalized.""
Less than four months passed between the time the lender made
the high bid for the property and the date when that bid was assigned
to a third party.47 The Mirabile court seems to have been especially
influenced by the very short time the lender actually had control over
the property. In contrast, the Maryland Bank & Trust court empha-
sized that a lender in a similar situation was not entitled to the secur-
41. Id.
42. Id. ("Financial institutions are in a position to investigate and discover potential
problems in their secured properties. For many lending institutions, such research is
routine.").
43. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985); see also Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 (court specifically
stating that MB&T "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to protect its
security interest, but to protect its investment").
44. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
45. Id. at 20996.
46. See id.
47. Id. The lender also argued that its high bid at the foreclosure sale gave it only
equitable title to the property because its subsequent assignment of the bid prevented
the lender from ever acquiring full legal title. The court never reached this question,
holding instead that, regardless of the nature of the title, the lender's actions indicated
that it was seeking merely to protect its security interest. Id.
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ity interest exemption when "the former mortgagee has held title for
nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA cleanup.'4
8
Mirabile thus demonstrates the limits of the security interest ex-
emption. When the lender does not hold the property for a significant
period of time and does not operate the property in a way that contrib-
utes to the existing contamination, it may be able to sell the property
without incurring liability for CERCLA response costs.
B. The Lender as "Operator"
The security interest exemption of section 101(20)(A)' 9 is not a
blanket exemption for all holders of security interests. When a lender
"holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest"5
but also "participat[es] in the management"51 of the secured property,
the lender will be deemed to be an "owner or operator" for purposes of
CERCLA liability.2 The Mirabile court was the first to attempt to de-
fine what actions by a lender constitute participating in the manage-
ment of a facility.53
Mirabile was a suit by EPA to recover response costs for cleaning
up a hazardous waste disposal site which, at the time of the cleanup,
was owned by Anna and Thomas Mirabile. The Mirabiles joined two
lending institutions, American Bank and Trust Company (ABT) and
Mellon Bank (East) National Association (Mellon), as third-party de-
fendants. Both ABT and Mellon had provided financing to the former
owner who had operated a paint manufacturing business on the site at
the time the hazardous contamination occurred. ABT and Mellon both
filed motions for summary judgment claiming protection under the sec-
tion 101(20)(A) security interest exemption."
As discussed previously, ABT, which had actually foreclosed on
the property and was the high bidder at the subsequent foreclosure
sale, was granted summary judgment because the court found that it
48. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579. The court distinguished Mirabile
on the basis of this time differential, stating: "Because MB&T has held the property for
such an extended period of time, this Court need not consider the issue of whether a
secured party which purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly
resold it would be precluded from asserting the section 101(20)(A) exemption." Id. at
n.5.
49. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20996-97
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
54. Id. at 20994-95.
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had merely acted to protect its security interest in the property.55 The
court declined to grant Mellon's motion for summary judgment on the
basis that there existed "a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mellon
Bank . engaged in the sort of participation in management which
would bring a secured creditor within the scope of CERCLA
liability.""6
The court began its interpretation of the security interest exemp-
tion by noting that the exemption "plainly suggests that provided a
secured creditor does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the
actual owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held
liable for cleanup costs. '57 Thus, the problem with interpreting section
101(20)(A) was "in determining how far a secured creditor may go in
protecting its financial interests before it can be said to have acted as
an owner or operator within the meaning of the statute."58
The court ultimately concluded that the security interest exemp-
tion evidenced the intent of Congress "to draw a distinction between
parties involved in the actual operation of the facility and those who
are involved in what may properly be characterized as the financial
aspects of the business conducted at the facility . . . ,,19 The court
ruled that a secured creditor's mere financial ability to control waste
disposal practices was not sufficient for the imposition of liability.60 In-
stead, "before a secured creditor. . . may be held liable, it must, at a
minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the
site."61 Because some evidence existed that Mellon had become in-
volved in the day-to-day operations of its borrower, the court reluc-
tantly denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment.
6 2
The Mirabile court failed to define adequately what actions by a
creditor constitute "participating in management" such that the credi-
tor will subject itself to CERCLA liability. The court indicated that
some financial activities-such as monitoring the borrower's cash col-
lateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went to the proper account,
and establishing a reporting system between the borrower and the
lender-would not subject the lender to CERCLA liability.63 The
court, however, also indicated that some steps a financial institution
normally would take to assist a troubled borrower could subject the
55. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
56. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20997.
57. Id. at 20995.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 20995-96.
60. Id. at 20995.
61. Id. at 20996.
62. See id. at 20997.
63. See id.
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lender to CERCLA liability. These potentially dangerous actions in-
clude conditioning the borrower's continued credit on its acceptance of
day-to-day supervision by the lender. The court also indicated that the
interjection of advice by a lender on such matters as the borrower's
personnel or production practices could subject the lender to CERCLA
liability.64 Beyond these very basic guidelines, "participating in man-
agement" remains undefined.
The issue of lender liability recently was revisited in United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp.65 Unlike Mirabile, in which private par-
ties were attempting to implead their lenders, Fleet Factors involved
an attempt by EPA to expand the concept of "owner or operator." Be-
cause the lender never foreclosed on the real property, there was no
question as to whether the lender was a present "owner" of the prop-
erty. Instead, the case centered on the EPA's contentions that the
lender was an "operator" of the facility at the time of disposal of haz-
ardous substances.
First, the EPA contended that the lender was an "operator" of the
facility because it had participated in the business operations of the
former owner of the site prior to bankruptcy. During this period, the
lender's involvement in the operations of the debtor had been limited
to approving customer's credit prior to shipment and receiving a por-
tion of the sales proceeds to be applied against the outstanding indebt-
edness. Noting that this was normal practice for a secured lender
under a factoring arrangement, the court adopted the interpretation of
the lender liability exclusion established in Mirabile, stating that the
exclusion permits "secured creditors to provide financial assistance and
general, and even isolated instances of specific, management advice to
its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor
does not participate in the day-to-day management of the business or
facility either before or after the business ceases operation." 66
Second, the- EPA claimed that the lender became an "operator"
during the liquidation because its agents or representatives released
hazardous substances in the course of the auction and removal of the
inventory and equipment. There was evidence that the auctioneer had
moved leaking drums of chemicals from the sales area, causing some
spillage, and that some of the purchasers had dislodged asbestos in re-
moving equipment they had purchased. The court held that this evi-
dence presented a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether the lender was an operator of the property at the time of dis-
64. See id.
65. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
66. Id. at 960.
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posal of hazardous substances.6 7
The magnitude of the liabilities at stake for lenders is illustrated
by Grantors to the Silresim Site Trust v. State Street Bank & Trust
Co., 8 a case recently filed in Massachusetts."9 In State Street Bank a
group of some 200 companies has filed suit against a lender for the
entire $30 to $50 million cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste treat-
ment site operated by the Silresim Chemical Corporation. The plain-
tiffs allege that a consultant hired by the lender to help manage the
site and protect its interests exercised effective control over the day-to-
day operation of Silresim and that the lender was, therefore, an "oper-
ator" of the facility and is liable for the costs of cleanup.70
C. Individual Liability of the Lender's Corporate Officers and
Directors
The security interest exemption also must be interpreted with ref-
erence to earlier decisions that held that corporate officers71 and stock-
holders72 may be held individually liable under CERCLA. These deci-
sions, read in light of Mirabile, indicate that lenders should be
especially wary of placing their corporate officers on the boards of
troubled borrowers and accepting shares of the borrower's stock if the
lender subsequently will become involved in the day-to-day operations
of the borrower.
In United States v. Carolawn3 a federal district court read the
security interest exemption as showing that "CERCLA contemplates
personal liability of corporate officials. . . who are responsible for the
day-to-day operations of a hazardous waste disposal business. ' 7" The
court went on to rule that "to the extent that an individual has control
or authority over the activities of a facility from which hazardous sub-
stances are released or participates in the management of such a facil-
ity, he may be held liable for response costs incurred at the facility
67. Id. at 960-61.
68. No. 88-1324-k (D. Mass. filed Sept. 21, 1988).
69. See Mays, Secured Creditors and Superfund: Avoiding the Liability Net, 20
Env't. Rep. (BNA) 609, 613 (July 28, 1989).
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Carolavm Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699, 20700 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
72. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (security
interest exemption "implies that an owning stockholder who manages the corporation..
is liable under CERCLA as an 'owner or operator' ").
73. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
74. Id. at 20700.
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notwithstanding the corporate character of the business. ' 75 Under this
reasoning, a corporate officer or employee of a lender who was placed
on the board of a troubled borrower in order to oversee its financial
affairs could be held personally liable for CERCLA response costs.
Similarly, in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.76 the Second Circuit
ruled that a corporate officer and stockholder who was responsible for
the continuing release of a hazardous substance could be held individu-
ally liable for CERCLA response costs. The court implied that the
stockholder was an "owner or operator" of the facility because his
stock holdings could be seen as indicia of ownership. The security in-
terest exemption did not apply to the stockholder because he had ac-
tively participated in the management of the facility." The same rea-
soning would apply to a lender that accepted corporate stock from a
troubled borrower and subsequently became "overly entangled in the
affairs" of the corporation.
7 8
Issues relating to stockholder liability also arise in the context of
piercing the corporate veil between a parent and subsidiary. In such
cases, the government has urged the adoption of a uniform federal rule
on parent corporation liability.79 The rule suggested by the government
constitutes a significant change from federal common law and would
hold a parent corporation liable either when the subsidiary is inte-
grated in some substantial way into the business enterprise conducted
by the parent, or when the parent directly participated in the manage-
ment of the subsidiary.80 As justification for this change, the govern-
ment argues that the revised rule would better promote the purposes
for which CERCLA was enacted, and cites the general federal rule that
the corporate form may be ignored for public convenience, fairness and
equity.
81
The response of federal courts to this suggested expansion of par-
ent corporation liability has varied. In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v.
T.L. James & Co.82 a Louisiana federal district court held that, in the
absence of an express congressional directive to the contrary, the tradi-
tional federal test applies.83 Arguing for liability of the parent corpora-
75. Id.
76. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1052.
78. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
79. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James &
Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (D. La. 1988) (No. 88-4901), afl'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
80. See id.
81. Id. at 16-17.
82. 696 F. Supp. 222 (D. La. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 226.
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tion, the plaintiff in Joslyn pointed to common stock ownership,
shared directors, substantial loans (which were later repaid) from the
parent for the initial capitalization, and shared office facilities. The
court, however, noted that the subsidiary corporation strictly adhered
to basic corporate formalities by keeping its own books and records,
holding periodic shareholder and director meetings, ensuring that the
daily operations of the two corporations were separate, maintaining
separate ownership of property, paying employees of the subsidiary
from nonparent funds and filing separate income tax returns.84 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff did not show
such "total domination" of the subsidiary that the subsidiary could be
said to have "no separate corporate interest of its own and [to have]
functioned solely to achieve the purposes" of the parent.8 5 Thus, the
court ruled that, as a matter of law, the facts proved were insufficient
to justify piercing the corporate veil.86
The result in a recent case in the federal district court in Rhode
Island was quite different. In United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.81 the
court found the parent corporation liable "not only because public con-
venience, fairness, and equity dictate[d] such a result, but also due to
the all encompassing control which [the parent] had over [the subsidi-
ary] ... ."" The precise meaning of this holding is unclear. Although
there is language in the court's opinion that appears to endorse the
government's position, the court actually applied the traditional fed-
eral test in finding that the corporate form should be ignored. Thus,
the court cited the following factors in support of its holding: (1) the
parent's complete control of the day-to-day financial operations of the
subsidiary; (2) the parent's directive that contacts between the subsidi-
ary and the government (including contacts on environmental matters)
be handled by the parent; (3) the parent's requirement that all matters
relating to the subsidiary's leasing, buying, or selling of real estate and
to capital expenditures over $5,000 first be approved by the parent;
and (4) the parent's placement of its personnel in almost all director
and officer positions in the subsidiary.8 9
IV. THE INNOCENT LENDER DEFENSE
The court decisions in Maryland Bank & Trust, Mirabile and
84. Id. at 231.
85, Id. at 227.
86, Id. at 231-32.
87. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
88. Id. at 24.
89. Id. at 22.
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Shore Realty all were rendered prior to the passage of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).9 0 Accordingly,
the defendants in those cases were unable to avail themselves of an
affirmative defense which SARA added to CERCLA.
Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA provides a complete defense for de-
fendants who can show that the release or threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance and the resulting damage were caused solely by
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance... and, (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions .... 9'
Accordingly, in order to take advantage of this third-party defense, a
defendant must establish the following factors: (1) that the contamina-
tion on the property was caused solely by a third party; (2) that the
actions of the third party did not occur in connection with any direct
or indirect contractual relationship between the third party and the
defendant; and (3) that the defendant took due care in preventing or
mitigating the contamination.
A major issue under CERCLA prior to the passage of SARA was
whether a current owner could claim that a prior owner was solely re-
sponsible for any contamination and thereby invoke the section
107(b)(3) defense. This issue usually became a question of whether the
deed or other instrument conveying the property from the prior owner
to the current owner was a "contract" for purposes of the section
107(b)(3) defense. SARA attempted to resolve this question by amend-
ing CERCLA to define the term "contractual relationship" as it was
used in section 107(b)(3).
92
Section 101(35)(A) defines a contractual relationship in such a way
that any deed or other instrument conveying title or possession to real
property will be considered a contract unless the acquiring party did
not know or have any reason to know that hazardous substances had
been disposed of on the property. 3 This definition of "contractual rela-
tionship," while actually an additional requirement to establishing a
section 107(b)(3) defense, became known as the innocent landowner
90. See supra note 14.
91. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
92. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
93. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
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defense."'
In order to establish an innocent landowner defense, a defendant
must, at the time of purchase, have undertaken an "appropriate in-
quiry" into the previous uses of the property.95 In deciding whether a
purchaser has conducted an appropriate inquiry, section 101(35)(B) in-
structs courts to take into account any expertise possessed by the de-
fendant, the actual purchase price of the property as compared to the
value of the property if uncontaminated, any reasonably available in-
formation about the property, the obviousness of the contamination,
and whether an appropriate inspection of the property would have de-
tected the presence of contamination."
While section 101(35)(B) only modifies the third-party defense of
section 107(b)(3), it in effect codifies a general due diligence standard
for all persons involved in real estate transactions. In order to be free
of potential liability for CERCLA cleanup costs, a purchaser of real
estate must comply with all the requirements of the third-party de-
fense under section 107(b)(3) and all the requirements of the innocent
landowner defense under section 101(35)(b).
97
Questions about how the innocent landowner defense would be im-
plemented were raised soon after SARA was passed."" On June 6, 1989,
the EPA released a long-awaited guidance document on landowner lia-
bility under CERCLA.99 Unfortunately, the guidance document sheds
little light on what steps a prospective purchaser must take to conduct
the appropriate inquiry required by section 101(35)(B). 100 Legislation
currently pending in Congress would amend section 101(35) to provide
a specific definition of what steps are required to satisfy the "all appro-
94. See Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability, supra note 31, at 1269.
95. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
96. Id.
97. Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 156-58; Note, When a Security
Becomes a Liability, supra note 31, at 1268-69.
98. See Issues in Instituting Revised Superfund Law Remain Unresolved, Accord-
ing to CMA Attorney, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1480-81 (Dec. 26, 1986) ("How the innocent
landowner defense will work and how using the defense will affect real estate transac-
tions need to be determined .... ).
99. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON LAND-
OWNER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 107(A)(1) OF CERCLA, DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS
UNDER SECTION 122(Q)(1)(B) oF CERCLA. AND SErLEMENTs WITH PROSPECTIVE PUR-
CHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (June 6, 1989) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON LAND-
OWNER LIABILITY].
100. See generally O'Brien, EPA's Landowner Liability Guidance Unsatisfactory
for Lenders and Purchasers, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 169, 169 (July 31, 1989) ("There is
little 'guidance' in the guidance, however, as to what constitutes all appropriate
inquiry.").
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priate inquiry" requirement."'0 Until such legislation is adopted, the
innocent landowner defense is of little use to prospective purchasers
and their lenders.
V. AVOIDING THE LENDER TRAP
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that no authority ex-
ists telling lenders precisely how to avoid CERCLA liability. Nonethe-
less, some basic principles for avoiding CERCLA lender liability can be
distilled from existing case law. First, the lender should perform an
environmental audit before making any loan upon potentially contami-
nated property. The results of this audit will permit the lender to
make an informed judgment regarding the risk of incurring CERCLA
liability, which can then be factored into the lending decision.
Second, the lender should minimize participation in the borrower's
business or ownership of the property. The lender should carefully as-
sess the risks created by equity participation, rights of control instruc-
tions regarding business operations, approval of expenditures and
other management decisions, and the myriad of other "standard" pro-
visions which entangle the lender with the borrower's waste disposal
practices, even indirectly.
Third, upon default, the lender should carefully weigh the risks
inherent in a foreclosure. The lender should investigate the borrower's
waste handling practices, consider a pre-foreclosure environmental au-
dit, and carefully weigh any instructions or decisions (such as the cut-
off of further funds) for their potential contribution to CERCLA
liability.
Fourth, upon foreclosure, the lender should take every step to liq-
uidate the property as promptly as possible, avoiding the exercise of all
indicia of ownership. The lender should consider a pre-foreclosure
Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure to a third-party purchaser, Chapter 11 re-
organization, a workout or other alternative to directly taking title so
as to avoid becoming the owner of a hazardous waste site.
Finally, upon becoming owner of a hazardous waste site, the lender
should move swiftly to develop a strategy for resolving the environ-
mental problems with the state and federal government. Only in ex-
101. See H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The Innocent Landowner Defense
Amendments of 1989 would establish a rebuttable presumption that a purchaser has sat-
isfied the "all appropriate inquiry" requirement of section 101(35)(B) if the prospective
purchaser carried out "an investigation into [the following] three general areas regarding
the environmental condition of [the] real estate: (1) historical research into previous
ownership and uses; (2) a comprehensive governmental records review at the Federal,
State, and local level; and (3) a site investigation of the property and its improvements."
135 CONG. REC. E2367-68 (daily ed. June 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
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treme cases will the lender benefit from extended litigation with the
government and, in any event, this course should be the choice of the
lender who has carefully thought out a CERCLA liability strategy.
Although the cases and statutes cited in this Article give some
broad guidance with respect to CERCLA lender liability, they are most
remarkable for the questions they leave unanswered. The remainder of
this Article addresses unresolved questions in CERCLA lender
liability.
A. After Mirabile, What Constitutes "Participating in the
Management" of a Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility?
Mirabile has raised more questions than it has answered with re-
gard to what will be considered participating in the management of a
hazardous waste facility. The only distinct rule which emerges from
Mirabile is that merely providing general financial advice will not be
considered participating in management. 102 Thus, under Mirabile, ac-
tions a lender normally would take to assist a troubled borrower may
be construed as participating in the management of the borrower's
business.103
Future cases will decide what actions constitute the kind of partic-
ipation in the management of the borrower's business necessary to im-
pose CERCLA liability upon the lender. Any such rule must remain
faithful to the underlying goal of CERCLA's liability scheme: to allo-
cate the cost of cleanup among those who contributed to the problem.
One way that this goal could be served would be to define "participat-
ing in management" by looking to the developing law under CERCLA
regarding when a shareholder will be held personally liable for the ac-
tions of the corporation. Those cases have imposed liability on share-
holders only when the shareholders had been truly active in the day-
to-day operations of the corporation and were directly involved in de-
cisions regarding the handling or disposal of hazardous waste.104 The
102. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995-
96 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). The court did specifically state that certain types of day-to-
day financial operations would not give rise to CERCLA liability. These specific activi-
ties "includ[e] monitoring the cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables [go] to
the proper account, and establishing a reporting system between the company and the
bank," Id. at 20997.
103. For example, one of the reasons the court felt that Mellon may have partici-
pated in management was that it placed a bank employee on an advisory board designed
to steer the borrower through difficult financial straits. Id.
104. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1037-39, 1052-53 (2d Cir.
1985) (stockholder who managed corporation which bought hazardous waste storage site
made conscious decision not to clean up leaking drums of hazardous waste); United
States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699, 20699-700 (D.S.C. June
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Mirabile court looked to these cases, but concluded that they "provide
only limited guidance... because in each case the individual defend-
ants were extremely active in the affairs of closely held corpora-
tions."10 5 But that is precisely the point: those who are directly in-
volved in deciding how to dispose of hazardous waste should be held
liable if those decisions lead to environmental contamination.
Under this reasoning lenders would be "participating in manage-
ment" only if they directly control the borrower's waste disposal prac-
tices. If lenders control these decisions and choose inadequate disposal
methods, then they should be held liable for the consequences. If the
lender does not control these decisions, however, but merely advises
the borrower about cutting costs or streamlining operations in an envi-
ronmentally sound matter, the lender should not be held liable for en-
vironmental contamination it did not cause.
This approach would be consistent with existing principles of com-
mercial law governing when a lender, due to his influence and author-
ity over the borrower, may become liable for all the borrower's
debts.110 Under the alter ego (instrumentality) rule, a lender may be-
come liable for all of the debts of its borrower only if it has "assumed
actual, participatory and total control" over the borrower.107 Similarly,
the doctrine of equitable subordination allows a lender's claims against
his borrower to be subordinated to those of other creditors if the
lender's control over the borrower amounted to domination of the
debtor's will. 08
The "total control" test for interpreting what constitutes "partici-
pating in management" is appropriate for a number of reasons. It
would serve the goal of CERCLA by imposing liability on lenders who
become "overly entangled" in the affairs of their borrowers, while at
the same time insulating from liability those lenders who are not di-
15, 1984) (individuals were owners and officers in closely-held corporation which dis-
posed of hazardous waste); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (vice president of hazardous waste generator
was directly responsible for arranging the disposal and transport of the hazardous
waste), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987).
105. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.
106. Several commentators have argued persuasively that lender liability under
CERCLA should be interpreted with reference to the analogous body of commercial law
governing lender liability. See Burcat, supra note 38, at 528-31; Note, Interpreting the
Meaning of Lender Management Participation, supra note 31, at 934-43.
107. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1105 (5th Cir. 1973); see Burcat, supra note 38, at 528-30; Note, Interpreting the Mean-
ing of Lender Management Participation, supra note 31, at 941-43.
108. See Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Participation, supra note 31, at
937-41.
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rectly responsible for environmental contamination.109 Moreover, using
existing principles of commercial law to interpret the meaning of "par-
ticipating in management" would be consistent with basic rules of stat-
utory construction which hold that statutes should be construed with
reference to the common law as it existed at the time the statute was
adopted.11 0
Finally, these principles of debtor/creditor commercial law have
been in use long enough that lenders can determine which specific
practices may expose them to liability for having participated in man-
agement. In order to avoid liability under CERCLA, lenders should
not: (1) assume complete management of the borrower; (2) obtain or
utilize the right to have a third party assume management control over
the borrower; (3) make payments on behalf of the borrower to other
creditors; (4) determine the priority and/or timing of payments to
other creditors; (5) require the borrower to obtain the lender's consent
before making any bonus or dividend payments; (6) require that the
lender co-sign all of the borrower's checks; (7) require that the lender
approve all of the borrower's purchases; or (8) obtain or exercise veto
power over the borrower's business decisions.""
The use of these basic principles of commercial law to establish
recognizable standards of liability will allow lenders to operate with
reasonable expectations about their potential liability under CERCLA.
B. When, if Ever, Can a Lender Who Forecloses Take Advantage
of the Innocent Landowner Defense?
A lender holding a security interest in property which may be con-
taminated with hazardous wastes has few options if the borrower goes
into default. The lender may attempt to avoid any possibility of CER-
CLA liability by deciding not to foreclose and merely write off the un-
paid balance of the loan as a loss. Alternatively, the lender may fore-
close on the property but not bid at the foreclosure sale and hope that
some third party willing to shoulder any possible cleanup costs will
purchase the site. Finally, the lender may foreclose on the property,
purchase the site at the foreclosure sale, take title to the property and
109. As stated by one commentator, "the court should find that total control
amounting to ownership is what exposes the creditor to liability. Liability should be trig-
gered not just by nominal activities that appear to give creditors management or voting
control, but rather by actual exercise of such control that amounts to coercion, and, in
effect, actual ownership." Id. at 943.
110. See Burcat, supra note 38, at 532-33.
111. See Burcat, supra note 38, at 537-38; King, Lenders' Liability for Cleanup
Costs, 18 ENvTL. L. 241, 290-91 (1988).
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attempt to establish the third-party/innocent landowner defense."'
In deciding among these options, lenders should take pains to de-
termine the value of the security in both its contaminated and unpol-
luted states. If the likelihood of significant contamination is low and
the value of the site in its unpolluted condition is relatively high, it
may well make sense for the lender to take title to the property, incur
the cleanup costs and sell the property for a profit. Alternatively, a
lender may seek to complete a profitable transaction by assuming title
and avoiding CERCLA liability by establishing an innocent landowner
defense.
As discussed above,"'3 the innocent landowner defense is very diffi-
cult to establish. Essentially, the purchaser has to show that it made
"all appropriate inquiry" into the previous ownership and uses of the
property to establish that the purchaser "did not know and had no
reason to know that any hazardous substance[s] [had been] disposed of
on [the property]."'" 4 The problem is that, four years after the inno-
cent landowner defense was created by SARA, there is no general
agreement as to what steps are necessary to satisfy the "all appropriate
inquiry" requirement.
Since SARA, the typical approach in the lending industry has
been to conduct a Phase I Environmental Audit of the property."" Un-
fortunately, there is no agreement within the industry as to what a
Phase I Environmental Audit includes. Different federal loan guaran-
tee agencies have established different standards."6 A definitive stan-
dard for conducting a Phase I Environmental Audit is desperately
needed.117
Legislation currently pending in Congress would codify the re-
quirements for a Phase I Environmental Audit sufficient to establish
that the prospective purchaser has made "all appropriate inquiry" nec-
essary to invoke the innocent landowner defense."' The bill, intro-
duced on June 28, 1989, by Pennsylvania Representative Curt Weldon,
would require a five part-investigation: (1) a review of recorded chain
112. Comment, supra note 97, at 177.
113. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
114. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (Supp. V 1987).
115. O'Brien, supra note 100, at 171.
116. Compare FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE AssOCIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES (August 1, 1988) with FEDERAL HomE LOAN BA K BOARD,
THRIFT BULLETN 16: ENVIROMENTAL RISK AND LiMrry (February 6, 1989).
117. See O'Brien, supra note 100, at 170 ("The source of concern in the financial
markets has been the absence of some established standard .... Lenders and purchasers
need certainty in the quantification of risks involved in a transaction.").
118. The Innocent Landowner Defense Amendment of 1989, H.R. 2787, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989).
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of title documents for a period of fifty years; (2) a review of aerial pho-
tographs of the site if such photographs are reasonably obtainable from
state or local government agencies; (3) a search of federal, state and
local records to determine whether any environmental cleanup liens
have been placed on the property; (4) a search of reasonably obtainable
federal, state and local government records to determine whether the
property has been associated with incidents or activities likely to have
caused contamination; and (5) a visual site inspection of the property
and any immediately adjacent properties.1 19
Noticeably absent from the Weldon bill is any requirement for on-
site sampling for hazardous wastes. The inclusion of such a require-
ment, however, would resolve one major problem which has faced lend-
ers: whether expensive environmental sampling is a prerequisite to es-
tablishing an innocent landowner defense.12 0
The Weldon bill does not specifically distinguish between commer-
cial and residential transactions, but Representative Weldon's intro-
ductory statement indicates that the amendment is intended to govern
only commercial sales. 21 This is consistent with EPA's recent guidance
on landowner liability and is a realistic approach to the different levels
of sophistication involved in the different transactions.1
22
The specific details of the Weldon bill will and should be de-
bated, 123 but the bill at least represents an attempt to establish reason-
able standards so that lenders will be able to predict with some level of
certainty the risks they face in financing the acquisition of real
property.
Even if a lender can establish the innocent landowner defense
under section 101(35)(B), still it must meet the other requirements of
the third-party defense: that it exercised due care with respect to any
119. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 2-4.
120. See O'Brien, supra note 100, at 171 ("Whether 'punching holes' is always part
of 'all appropriate inquiry' has been, and continues to be, the most troublesome issue in
environmental due diligence.").
121. See 135 CONG. REc. E2367-68 (daily ed. June 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Wel-
don). Representative Weldon argued:
"The congressional intent regarding the current legislation clearly distin-
guishes between commercial transactions and private, residential transactions.
The EPA Guidance on Landowner Liability and the case law addressing the
issue have also realized that commercial transactions are held to a higher stan-
dard and that it is appropriate that parties to commercial transactions look
before they buy or lend on commercial properties."
Id. at E2368.
122. See GUIDANCE ON LANDOWNER LIAmLrry, supra note 99, at 11-12; O'Brien,
supra note 100, at 172-73.
123. If a 50-year title search is good, might a 75-year title search be better? Should
sampling be a requirement of a Phase I Environmental Audit?
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hazardous substances and took precautions against the foreseeable acts
or omissions of any third parties. 2 " This always will depend on the
facts of each given situation, but a lender who takes title to property
which may be contaminated with hazardous wastes can take steps to
maximize its chances of meeting the requirements of the third-party
defense.
As the court in Mirabile indicated, one major step a foreclosing
lender can take is to secure the property to prevent vandalism.12 5 Such
a simple action, which often is normal procedure in such situations,
certainly will help show that the lender fulfilled its duty to protect
against the actions of third parties. Similarly, a lender can show that it
is exercising due care by cooperating with any local, state or federal
investigation to determine whether hazardous wastes are present on
the property.
C. The Toughest Issue: How Long May A Lender Own
Contaminated Property and Still Avoid CERCLA Liability?
The length of time a lender who forecloses on contaminated prop-
erty may own the property before incurring CERCLA liability is a
point on which a sharp contrast can be drawn with respect to the deci-
sions in Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust. Mirabile held that a
lender who sold off contaminated property within four months of ac-
quiring it was entitled to the protection of the security interest exemp-
tion of section 101(20)(A)."2 6 At the other extreme, Maryland Bank &
Trust held that a lender who retained ownership of contaminated
property for nearly four years was not entitled to the exemption. 27 Al-
though other factors certainly entered into the court's calculations, the
length of time title was held was undoubtedly a major factor in the
opposite outcome of the two cases.
What is the liability of a lender that forecloses on mortgaged prop-
erty, later purchases it at the foreclosure sale, never operates the facil-
ity, but owns it for more than four months but less than four years? A
court when faced with this situation most likely will attempt to mini-
mize the significance of Mirabile. The case is highly susceptible to be-
ing limited to its facts. In Mirabile, American Bank & Trust appar-
ently never actually took legal title to the site. The bank made the high
124. See CERCLA § 107(b)(3)(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
125. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20996 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986).
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bid at the foreclosure sale, but assigned this bid to the Mirabiles four
months later. The court never addressed the issue of whether this ac-
tion prevented the bank from acquiring legal title.128 A court con-
fronted with a situation in which there is no doubt that the lender has
full legal title to the contaminated property, regardless of the length of
time the lender held title, could readily find Mirabile inapposite and
impose CERCLA liability on the lender. This result is especially likely
since courts have indicated that such liability may be imposed on per-
sons who have held legal title to contaminated property for as little as
one hour. 129
D. May a Lender Be Liable for CERCLA Response Costs Incurred
After it Sells Foreclosed Property?
As originally drafted, CERCLA imposed liability only on the cur-
rent owner of a hazardous waste disposal site and any person who
owned the facility at the time hazardous wastes were disposed of
there.130 SARA, however, added another provision which could be used
to impose liability on a lender who forecloses on contaminated prop-
erty and later sells it to a third party.
Section 101(35)(C) provides that a former owner may be held lia-
ble for subsequent CERCLA response costs even though the former
owner did not own the property during disposal and is not the current
owner, if the former owner obtained actual knowledge of the contami-
nation when it owned the property and did not disclose this fact to the
subsequent purchaser.131 Moreover, a former owner failing to disclose
this information at the time of sale would be unable to use the third-
party defenses provided by section 107(b)(3).2
3 2
This provision may expand significantly the potential liability of
lenders who foreclose on contaminated property. If a lender were to
take all the steps necessary to conduct the "appropriate inquiry"
needed to establish the innocent landowner defense and find the pres-
ence of some contamination, not only would the lender lose the de-
fense, but it also would be under an affirmative duty to disclose the
contamination to any prospective purchasers. The practical effect of
this provision is that lenders who foreclose on property with the inten-
128. See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20996.
129. See United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20698
(D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (firm which acted as a conduit in the transfer of title to a hazard-
ous waste disposal site and held legal title to the site for less than one hour could be an
"owner" for purposes of CERCLA).
130. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2) (1982) (amended 1986).
131. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (Supp. V 1987).
132. See id.
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tion of selling it as quickly as possible may instead become owners in
perpetuity.
E. The Lender as a De Minimis Party
A lender who incurs liability under CERCLA should nevertheless
examine the prospect of de minimis treatment. Although conceptually
the de minimis provisions of SARA and the EPA's settlement policy
are aimed at those whose contribution to the volume of waste at a site
is small and negligibly toxic, the provisions also provide an important
middle ground for the lender that is strictly liable under CERCLA's
scheme, but is less culpable than the major generators at the site.
Section 122(g)(1)(B) of SARA13 3 allows the government to enter
into a final settlement with a potentially responsible party if the settle-
ment involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the rele-
vant facility, the potentially responsible party's contribution of hazard-
ous substances to the facility was minimal in comparison to other
hazardous substances disposed of there, and the toxic effects of the
wastes contributed by the potentially responsible party are minimal
compared to other wastes disposed of at the site.3
The de minimis settlement provision is especially useful to lenders
because it is only available to potentially responsible parties who are
owners of the hazardous waste disposal facility, did not conduct or per-
mit the disposal of hazardous wastes at the facility, and did not con-
tribute to the release of wastes through any act or omission. 13 5 The
settlement is not available to any potentially responsible person who
had actual or constructive knowledge that the property was used for
the disposal of hazardous wastes.
1 3 6
The EPA's landowner liability guidance is instructive regarding
what the EPA will require before it will enter into a de minimis settle-
ment. Essentially, the landowner seeking a de minimis settlement must
go through all the steps needed to establish an innocent landowner de-
fense.13 7 The difference is that while such steps might not be enough to
satisfy the amorphous "all appropriate inquiry" requirement, they may
be enough to convince the EPA to enter into a settlement agreement.
"The reason, of course, is to encourage the landowner to settle rather
than fight.
'138
133. SARA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
134. SARA § 122(g)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
135. SARA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
136. Id.
137. See GUMANCE ON LANDOWNER LIAmmrry, supra note 99, at 18; O'Brien, supra
note 100, at 172-73.
138. O'Brien, supra note 100, at 173.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The challenge for those who enforce the Superfund program, as
well as courts which place a final interpretation upon its provisions, is
to fashion a rule of CERCLA lender liability that is faithful to the
statutory language as well as the intent of the statute. Congress, which
unwittingly thrust upon the executive and judicial branches this uncer-
tain and difficult task, may choose to conclude its unfinished business
by clarifying the liability of lenders as the Superfund statute comes up
for reauthorization in 1991. Meanwhile, lenders must devise a strategy
for coping with the ambiguity and potentially ruinous liability lurking
in their transactions if they are to remain healthy and competitive in
the real estate finance business.
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